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Summary. I propose a competing risks decomposition of the difference in the restricted mean
lifetimes of two groups, which distinguishes between the incidence and duration effects of exit
states. I use the decomposition to evaluate the effect of a cut in unemployment benefits on
unemployment durations in Ireland. Whereas the aggregate effect of the benefit cut is similar
for men and women, the decomposition reveals that the channels through which the cut affects
unemployment durations differ substantially.
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1. Introduction
In survival analysis, interest centres on the time until an event occurs. If several types of event
can potentially occur, researchers and policy makers may wish to understand the effect of these
competing risks. The typical approach that is used in social science estimates cause-specific
competing risks hazard functions (Han and Hausman, 1990). However, this approach is not
appropriate if we are interested in decomposing differences in durations in the time domain;
although cause-specific hazards are usefulwhen examining the rate of occurrence of an outcome,
in the subset of peoplewhoare event free, they donot identify the absolute risk of a cause-specific
outcome (Austin and Fine, 2017; Andersen et al., 2012).
In this paper, I extend previous work on competing risks and propose a new decompo-
sition of the difference in restricted mean lifetimes between two groups. In particular, I de-
compose this difference into the contributions of distinct exit states, distinguishing between
duration and incidence effects of each state. The decomposition builds on the cumulative in-
cidence function (CIF) approach that has previously been used in the biomedical literature
and is valid irrespective of the shape of the underlying hazards or the dependence structure
across exit states. The approach is easily implemented by using existing software, even in the
presence of right-censored unemployment spells. I use the decomposition to re-examine the
labour market response of 18-year-old jobseekers in Ireland to a 50% cut in unemployment
benefits.
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The program that was used to analyse the data can be obtained from
https://rss.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/hub/journal/14679876/series-
c-datasets
2. Competing risks decomposition
A competing risk is an event whose occurrence precludes the occurrence of another event. One
cannot observe people who exit unemployment to training, also ending the same spell with
an exit to work. Identifying the importance of these alternative exit states is often crucial for
policy makers. For instance, shorter unemployment durations, which are driven by exits from
the labour market, are likely to be valued differently from shorter durations driven by exits to
work.
Whenfittingmodels in the presence of competing risks, researchers can choose tomodel either
the cause-specific hazard or on the cause-specific CIF. Cause-specific hazards estimate the rate
of occurrence of a specific outcome, in the subset of the population who are event free at the
specified time. This approach is widely used in the social science literature, e.g. when modelling
unemployment duration (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Dolton and O’Neill, 1996; McVicar, 2008;
van den Berg et al., 2014). However, the cause-specific hazard does not provide the information
that is needed for a competing risks decomposition of durations in the time domain. To see this,
consider the simple case in which we are interested in decomposing a conditional expectation,
E.Y |Y  τ /. (Later we shall extend this to consider decompositions of the τ -restricted mean
lifetimes, E{min.Y , τ /}, and show that similar issues arise.) Assuming K possible exits and
using the law of iterated expectations, we can write this as
E.Y |Y  τ /=
K∑
k=1
Pr.K=k,Y  τ /
Pr.Y  τ / E.Y |K=k, Y  τ /:
A key component in this expression is the cause-specific CIF, CIFk.τ /≡ Pr.K = k, Y  τ /,
which measures the absolute risk or incidence of failures from cause k, by time τ . Since any
CIFk.τ / depends on all the cause-specific hazards (Andersen et al., 2002), the cause-specific
hazard for exit k alone is not sufficient to identify the contribution of exit k to the overall mean
duration; in extreme cases a covariate, such as treatment status, may have a strong influence on a
cause-specific hazard but no effect on the cause-specificCIF (Fine andGray, 1999;Kyyra¨, 2009).
The objective of the current paper is to show how the CIFs can be used to decompose the
treatment effect of an intervention, measured in the time domain, into its competing risks
components. (This use of CIFk.τ / differs from that proposed in a series of papers by Lo and
Wilke (2010) and Lo et al. (2016, 2017) who extended the typical cause-specific hazard approach
by using estimates of CIFk.τ / together with a copula estimator to determine or bound the
unknown marginal survival functions, without imposing independent risks.) We are interested
in comparing the difference in the average outcomes of a treated group and a control group
at a given threshold, τ weeks after an intervention. Let Y be a random variable representing
durations.At time τ , the recordedduration for any individual is either the lengthof the completed
spell, if this is less than τ , or τ if the spell is on going. To carry out the evaluation in this setting I
follow Royston and Parmar (2013) and conduct the analysis in terms of restricted mean survival
times. The τ -restricted mean lifetime is defined as
e.0, τ /=
∫ τ
0
S.y/dy
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where S.y/ = Pr.Y > y/. The restricted mean lifetime measures the expected duration up to
time τ ; E{min.Y , τ /}. To measure the success of an intervention, at time τ , I compare the τ -
restricted mean lifetimes of a treatment group T and a control group C. The object of interest
is Δ.τ /≡ eT.0, τ /− eC.0, τ /, a treatment effect that is valid under any distribution of time to
event and is readily interpretable in the time domain (Royston and Parmar, 2013).
To allow for competing risks, assume that the duration can end in one ofK mutually exclusive
ways. Andersen (2013) showed that the difference in the τ -restricted mean lifetimes between a
treatment group T and a control group C can be written as
Δ.τ /=∑
k
[∫ τ
0
{CIFkC.y/−CIFkT.y/}dy
]
: .1/
The term inside the square brackets provides a measure of the contribution of exit state
k to the difference in restricted mean lifetimes. Non-parametric estimation of the CIFs in
the presence of right-censored survival data is straightforward by using Kaplan–Meier or
Aalen–Johansen methods. Δ.τ / is therefore well defined and can be estimated and decom-
posed, even when the difference in unrestricted means,Δ.∞/, may be ill determined because of
censoring.
The Andersen decomposition, given in equation (1), measures the cause-specific contribution
to differences in durations by the differences in the areas under the cause-specific CIFs. (For a
comparison of theAndersen approachwith other competing risks decompositions seeAndersen
et al. (2013).) However, as noted by Huang et al. (2016), analysis based solely on the areas under
the CIFs can be confounded by differences in the prevalence rates of the competing events across
groups.Usingonly the difference in areas under theCIFs, it is not possible to distinguish between
a programme that resulted in fewer people exiting to work (an incidence effect), but resulted in
those who did exit, doing so quicker (a duration effect), and a programme that had no effect
on either the duration or incidence of people exiting to work. To account for this, I propose an
extension of the Andersen decomposition, which further decomposes the aggregate effect into
both a duration effect and an incidence effect.
To derive the extended decomposition, rewrite the difference in restricted means as
Δ.τ /=∑
k
(
CIFkT.τ /
[
τ −
∫ τ
0
CIFkT.y/
CIFkT.τ /
dy−
{
τ −
∫ τ
0
CIFkC.y/
CIFkC.τ /
dy
}]
+ {CIFkT.τ /−CIFkC.τ /}
{
τ −
∫ τ
0
CIFkC.y/
CIFkC.τ /
dy
})
+ Rτ︸︷︷︸
remainder
=∑
k
[
CIFkT.τ /{E.YT|KT =k,YT τ /−E.YC|KC =k,YC τ /}︸ ︷︷ ︸
duration effect
+{CIFkT.τ /−CIFKC.τ /}E.YC|KC =k,YC τ /︸ ︷︷ ︸
incidence effect
]
+ Rτ︸︷︷︸
remainder
.2/
where Rτ = τ{ST.τ /−SC.τ /}. The second equality follows from the fact that
E.Yi|Ki =k,Yi τ /= τ −
∫ τ
0
CIFki.y/
CIFki.τ /
dy:
(For a proof see Appendix A.)
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The first term of the extended decomposition measures the duration effect of state k. If the
cause-specific incidences are the same for the control and treatment groups, i.e. CIFkT.τ /=
CIFkC.τ /, then all of the state k effect will be captured by the duration term, with a negative
contribution denoting quicker exits to a given state. The second term measures the incidence
effects of each exit state and is given by the differences in the CIFs, weighted by the average
duration for group C. If the average duration, conditionally on being in state k, is the same for
both groups, but more of the treatment group enter state k, then the first term will be 0 and
all of the state k effect will be picked up as a positive contribution in the incidence term. How
we interpret this component depends on the desirability of the exit state. When exit states are
seen as desirable (e.g. work) then a positive incidence effect reflects well on a programme. The
opposite is true for exits states that are considered undesirable (e.g. exits into inactivity).
In the abovedecomposition,Rτ =τ{ST.τ /−SC.τ /} captures differences in theoverall survival
rates at time τ . For limτ→∞ Rτ to be 0, ST.τ /−SC.τ / must be of order o.1=τ /. Thus an exact
decomposition, involving only the competing risks terms, imposes a convergence condition on
the survival functions of the treated and control groups. This condition will be automatically
satisfied in the absence of censoring. However, it is possible that a policy change may increase or
decrease the share of people who never exit, thus possibly leading to differences in higher quan-
tiles, so that Rτ does not vanish. In this case, all three terms will be present in decomposition (2),
with the remainder term measuring the effect of on-going spells on the differences in duration.
Further manipulation allows us to rewrite
CIFkT.τ /
[
τ −
∫ τ
0
CIFkT.y/
CIFkT.τ /
dy−
{
τ −
∫ τ
0
CIFkC.y/
CIFkC.τ /
dy
}]
=
∫ τ
0
{
θkCIFkC.y/−CIFkT.y/
}
dy .3/
where
θk = PrT.Y  τ ,D=k/PrC.Y  τ ,D=k/
= CIFkT.τ /
CIFkC.τ /
:
Andersen (2013) showed that the total difference in durations due to cause k can be represented
as the difference in the areas underneath the cause-specific CIFs. Equation (3) shows, likewise,
that the duration effect due to cause k canbe represented as the difference in rescaled CIFs,where
the scaling factor for the control group is simply θk. Furthermore, if CIFkT.τ /=CIFkC.τ /, de-
composition (2) simplifies to that proposed by Anderson (2013); in the absence of any incidence
effects both decompositions are identical.
Toproceedwith thedecomposition, it is sufficient tonote thatwell-behaved estimators exist for
all the key components of this extendeddecomposition,
∫ τ
0 CIFk.y/dy, CIFk.τ / andS.τ /, even in
the presence of independent right censoring (Putter et al., 2007). (In practice these components
can be easily estimated in Stata by using the stpci and stplost commands (Overgaard
et al., 2015).) Implementing the decomposition involves replacing the unknown
∫ τ
0 CIFk.y/dy,
CIFk.τ / and S.τ / with their corresponding estimators. By varying τ , the decomposition enables
us to examine how the contribution of the alternative states varies over the duration of a spell.
3. Application: changes to unemployment benefit
I use the above decomposition to evaluate the effect of a substantial cut to Jobseeker’s Allowance
(JA) in Ireland in 2009. JA is a means-tested benefit, which is paid indefinitely to those who are
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unemployed, provided that the claimant meets the conditions of eligibility. In response to the
fiscal crisis that occurred in Ireland with the onset of the Great Recession, the Irish Government
introduced a substantial cut to JApayments for young claimants. Before 2009, all claimantswere
entitled to €204 per week. On April 29th, 2009, claimants aged 18 years had their weekly rate
cut to €100. The benefit cut applied only to new claimants; those who started their claim before
April 29th continued to receive the higher rate. As a result, a comparison of those who entered
unemployment just before and just after the legislation can be used to identify the treatment
effect. (Doris et al. (2017) found no evidence of an anticipation effect before the introduction
of the legislation.)
Doris et al. (2017) analysed this benefit cut in detail, using a regression discontinuity design,
and found that claimants subject to the cut had unemployment durations that were 50% shorter
than the durations of those in the control group. Given that the stated motivation for these
cuts was to ‘ensure that young people are better off in education, employment or training than
claiming’ (http://www.welfare.ie/en/pressoffice/Pages/pr231013.aspx), it
seems appropriate to consider, in detail, the relative importance of alternative exit states in
explaining the aggregate effect.
4. Data
To carry out the analysis, I use the longitudinal jobseekers’ database that is provided by the
Department of Social Protection. This is an administrative data set, covering every claimant
who has received a jobseeker’s or one-parent family payment since 2007. The data provide
administrative records for the start and end date of every new claim, allowing me to establish
both the exact start date and the duration of claiming unemployment benefits for the entire
population of new JA claims initiated between 2007 and 2014. I denote claim duration as
unemployment duration in what follows, although the former is only a subset of the latter.
Throughout the analysis, I measure unemployment duration in weeks. The administrative data
also record the exit state into which the claimant entered, after the unemployment spell ended.
When considering the competing risks model, I examine five different exit states: training,
work, education, inactivity and ‘other’. (The ‘other’ category is a residual grouping comprising,
primarily, durations for which the caseworkers could not establish an exit state for the spell.)
The data on exit states come from information that was provided by caseworkers, following
the closure of a claim. Information on training and education schemes are directly available
from administrative records. Some of the information on employment is likely to have been
provided by the claimant. I conducted several cross-checks to verify the accuracy of these data.
For instance, in cases where it was reported that the claimant exited to employment I checked
official administrative records, to see whether there was an employment tax record for the
claimant in the year that they exited unemployment. This was so for the majority of claimants.
In a small number of cases, some of those in the ‘other’ category had tax earnings records that
suggested that they had exited to work. I experimented by allocating these claimants to the work
category, but this had little effect on the results reported.
To identify the treatment effect, I compare the durations of those beginning an unemployment
spell inApril 2009 (who received the higher benefit payment) with those beginning a spell inMay
2009 (andwho received the substantially reduced payment). Table 1 provides summary statistics,
separately for those in the control and treatment groups. The first row of Table 1 reports the
average unemployment duration, by month of entry and gender. For all groups, the average
unemployment duration exceeded 1 year, highlighting the very poor labour market prospects
facing youngpeople in Irelandduring theGreatRecession.However, thosewho entered after the
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Table 1. Summary statistics by month of entry to unemployment
Results for males Results for females
May April May April
Average unemployment duration (weeks) 66.53 99.98 61.20 92.00
Proportion exiting to alternative labour market states
Proportion exiting to training 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.30
Proportion exiting to work 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.21
Proportion exiting to education 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11
Proportion exiting to other 0.26 0.25 0.20 0.19
Proportion exiting to inactive 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.18
N 428 377 297 210
benefit cut had unemployment durations that are approximately 30 weeks shorter, on average,
than those entering earlier.
Of particular interest in my study is the labour market states into which claimants exited. The
next five rows of Table 1 provide the proportions exiting to each of the alternative states. For
men, we see that three exit states dominated, namely training, work and other. Furthermore, the
proportion exiting to each state is similar for those entering in April and in May. This suggests
that the aggregate duration effect, for men, is driven by differences in duration, conditional
on exit states. The fourth column of Table 1 shows that, for women subject to the benefit cut,
the proportion exiting to each state is similar to those of men and is dominated by the same
three exit states. However, for women in receipt of the higher benefit, the pattern is notably
different. The difference, relative to those subjected to the lower benefit regime, is driven by a
bigger proportion of the treatment group exiting to work, and fewer exiting to inactivity and
education. Although differences in state-specific durations appear to be driving the male effect,
the results in the last two columns suggest that differences in incidences play a larger role for
women. In the remainder of the paper, I use the decomposition that was outlined in Section 3
to examine these issues formally.
5. Results
Since all of my sample had completed their unemployment spell 7 years after the intervention,
the remainder term in equation (2) is 0 by the end of my sample period. I therefore begin with an
exact decomposition of the overall means. The results are given in Table 2. (The standard errors
that are reported for the decomposition terms are estimated by using a bootstrap procedure with
1000 replications.) The first row reports the overall treatment effects. In keeping with Doris et al.
(2017), I estimate a large and statistically significant duration response to the benefit cut for both
men and women. The size of the aggregate effect is similar across genders; males subject to the
benefit cut have unemployment durations that are over 33 weeks shorter than those in receipt of
the higher benefit, whereas the effect for females is approximately 31 weeks. (In practice some
of the treatment group were exempted from benefit cut on family or health grounds. I have also
estimated the model by using month of treatment as an instrument to control for this. Although
the overall treatment effect increases somewhat there is still little evidence of a significantly
different aggregate effect for men and women.)
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Columns (1) and (4) of Table 2 present the total contribution of each exit state to the overall
treatment effect, making no distinction between incidence and duration effects. Looking at the
results for males, we see that no single exit state dominates. Whereas the contribution of exits to
education and inactivity are small, the other three exit states all contribute substantially to the
overall effect. The shorter overall duration formales is therefore a result of exits to training, work
and other. Looking at the results for females in column (4), we see that exits to work contribute
the least to the overall female effect. In contrast, exits to inactivity, although not important
for men, are the dominant channel for women. The fact that very similar aggregate effects for
men and women operate through very different channels highlights the potential value of the
competing risks decomposition that is developed in this paper.
The contributions of the duration and incidence effects, to these overall state-specific compo-
nents, are given in columns (2) and (3) of Table 2 for men, and columns (5) and (6) for women.
Looking at the duration effect for men, we see that, conditionally on exiting to a given state,
those in receipt of the lower benefit exited quicker than those in the control group. For instance,
the results show that, if the overall proportion exiting to training had been identical, the average
durations of those in the treatment group would still have been approximately 10 weeks shorter,
as a result of the quicker exits to training. The duration effect is particularly evident for the
three main effects that were identified earlier: training, work and other. The incidence effects,
in contrast, show that differences in the likelihood of exiting to a given state are relatively less
important for men.
The duration effects for women in Table 2 are quite similar to those reported for men. Con-
ditionally on exiting to a given state, those in receipt of the lower benefit exit quicker than those
in the control group. This is particularly true for exits to work, where the duration effect is
larger for women than for men. This is despite the fact that exits to work did not appear to be
important for women in the overall decomposition. This is because, in addition to the duration
effect, the work incidence effect is positive and large for women, implying that women who are
subject to the benefit cut are substantially more likely to enter work. Both of these work effects
would be considered desirable but offset each other in the aggregate decomposition.
The importance of distinguishing between duration and incidence effects for women is also
evident when we consider exits to inactivity. The estimate in the final row of column (5) shows
little difference in the timing of exits to inactivity, for women in the treatment and control
groups. The large overall effect of inactivity that is apparent in column (4) is therefore driven
entirely by the incidence effect; women subject to the benefit cut are much less likely to exit to
inactivity.
Exits to inactivity for women can also be used to illustrate graphically the value of the new
decomposition. Fig. 1(a) compares the inactivity CIFs for women in the control and treatment
groups. A comparison of the areas under these curves corresponds to the decomposition that
was proposed by Andersen (2013). Such a comparison clearly reveals substantial differences
between the two groups. However, although the differences in incidences can be inferred from
this graph, it is impossible, from this comparison alone, to determine the relative importance of
duration and incidence effects. Fig. 1(b) provides the graph for the conditional duration effect,
using the rescaling adjustment that is suggested in equation (3). The similarity of these two
curves immediately implies that the overall effect that is observed in Fig. 1(a) is driven entirely
by the incidence component.
The decomposition that was presented in Section 3 also enables us to examine the evolution
of the overall treatment effect, by varying the follow-up threshold τ . The results in Tables 3–5
provide the decomposition at three thresholds: 2 years, 4 years and 6 years after the intervention.
Looking at Table 3 we see that, for both men and women, the restricted mean treatment effect
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(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Graphical representation of (a) total effect and (b) duration effect accounted for by exits to inactivity
for females: , May; — —, April
at 2 years is large and statistically significantly different from 0. Furthermore, in keeping with
the overall final effect, there is little difference in the magnitude of the 2-year treatment effect
between men and women. This is also true of the estimated treatment effects at the 4-year and
6-year thresholds.
The results inTable 3 also show that the incidence effects forwomen,whichwere highlighted in
Table 2, are already evident at the 2-year threshold; even in the early stages of the unemployment
spell women who were subjected to the benefit cut are more likely to exit to work, and less likely
to exit to inactivity. For men the dynamics are different. In Table 2 we saw that the overall effect
for men was driven primarily by the training and work duration effects. However, from Tables
3–5, we see that these patterns take some time to emerge; the significant training duration effect
is only evident at the 4-year threshold, whereas the work duration effect is not evident until the
6-year threshold. In the early stages of the spell, it appears that males who were subjected to the
benefit cut reacted mostly by increasing participation in training schemes. It follows from this
that the results of any evaluation, such as this, must take into account the timing of the study. In
my example, a short-run follow-up would reveal only a training incidence effect, while masking
the work duration effect that is evident in the longer run.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I consider how to deal with competing risks when the outcome of interest is the
difference in average duration between two groups. I propose a competing risks decomposition,
which identifies the contribution of each exit state to the overall difference in duration between
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the two groups, distinguishing between differences in duration, conditionally on an exit state,
and differences in the absolute risk of exits to each state.
I use the decomposition to examine the effect of a 50% cut to unemployment benefit in
Ireland. The aggregate effect of the benefit cut is substantial for both men and women, with
unemployment duration falling by 33 weeks for men and 31 weeks for women. However, the
decomposition reveals substantial gender differences in the channels through which this effect
operates, with the incidence effect substantially more important for women than for men. These
differences may also have implications for the long-run effects of the benefit cut, which are
not examined in this paper. The increase in the number of young women exiting work after the
benefit cutmay strengthen their life-longattachment to the labourmarket, resulting in additional
benefits, which are not apparent when we focus only on the duration of unemployment at the
time of the cut.
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Appendix A
Theorem 1. Let Y be any random variable:
E.Y |K=k, Y  τ /= τ −
∫ τ
0
CIFk.y/
CIFk.τ /
dy
Proof. For any random variable X
E.X/=
∫ ∞
0
S.x/dx S.x/=Pr.X>x/:
Specifically,
E.Y |K=k, Y  τ /=
∫ ∞
0
Pr .Y u|K=k, Y  τ /du:
Using the conditional probability law we can rewrite this as∫ ∞
0
Pr.Y u, Y  τ , K=k/
Pr.Y  τ , K=k/ du:
By definition of CIFk.τ / this can be written as
1
CIFk.τ /
∫ ∞
0
Pr.Y u, Y  τ , K=k/du
= 1
CIFk.τ /
{∫ τ
0
Pr.Y u, Y  τ , K=k/du+
∫ ∞
τ
Pr.Y u, Y  τ , K=k/du
}
:
However, since the last term above is 0 we can rewrite this as
= 1
CIFk.τ /
∫ τ
0
Pr.Y u, Y  τ , K=k/du:
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Using the fact that Pr.Y>y, K=k/=1−Pr.Y<y, K=k/−Pr.K =k/=Pr.K=k/−Pr.Y<y, K=k/ this
equals
1
CIFk.τ /
∫ τ
0
{Sk.u/−Sk.τ /}du Sk.y/≡ Pr.Y>y, K=k/
= 1
CIFk.τ /
{∫ τ
0
Pr.K=k/du−
∫ τ
0
CIFk.u/du−
∫ τ
0
Sk.τ /du
}
= 1
CIFk.τ /
{
τ Pr.K=k/−
∫ τ
0
CIFk.u/du− τ Sk.τ /
}
:
Again using the fact that Pr.Y> τ , K=k/ = Pr.K=k/−Pr.Y< τ , K=k/ this equals
1
CIFk.τ /
(
τ Pr.K=k/−
∫ τ
0
CIFk.u/du− [τ {Pr.K=k/−CIFk.τ /}]
)
= 1
CIFk.τ /
{
τ CIFk.τ /−
∫ τ
0
CIFk.u/du
}
= τ −
∫ τ
0
CIFk.u/
CIFk.τ /
du
as required.
Note that if K = 1 so that there is only one exit state this simplifies to the standard expression for the
conditional mean:
E.Y |Y  τ /= τ −
∫ τ
0
CIF.y/
CIF.τ /
dy=
∫ τ
0
S.y/−S.τ /
1−S.τ / dy:
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